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The concept of technostress – meaning stress caused by information and communication
technologies – initially emerged in the 1980s, around the same time as the first personal
computers were introduced into organizational use (siop.org). The first scientific article
on the topic dates back to 1982 (Brod 1982) and describes stress symptoms caused by
situations such as an employee having to start using a word processing system or having
a computer terminal placed near the employee’s workstation. Nowadays technology plays
a central role in organizations, and employees are constantly expected to develop and
master new skills in new areas of technological innovation. It is nearly impossible to find
a job posting that does not state some sort of technical skillset as a prerequisite for the
applicant.
As information security incidents are on the rise (PWC 2015), the concept of tech-
nostress has been getting new dimensions. The exponential development rate of new tech-
nologies has brought along with it various and significant information security threats
which organizations aim to fight against through information security policies and prac-
tices. Employees are expected to keep their information security knowledge and skills up
to date with all the fast developments in both technology and cybercrime. Adopting new
cybersecurity measures is causing stress in employees, and the results are detrimental to
productivity (udel.edu 2014). Examples of stressful situations include having to remem-
ber a variety of passwords without storing them anywhere, being afraid of accidentally
divulging confidential data or unintentionally causing a security breach (Ament & Haag
2016).
It is a common belief that employees are the biggest threat to information security in
organizations (fortune.com 2016; forbes.com 2011). The little research that has been done
on the topic of information security stress (D’Arcy et al. 2014; Ament & Haag 2016; Lee
et al. 2016) has proven that the phenomenon exists in organizations and that the implica-
tions are serious. It is therefore evident that more research on what employees find stress-
ful is needed. The topic it is a fairly new research area for information systems (IS) re-
search, all the while presenting a very real threat to companies. The results and practical
implications that can be drawn from this research are useful for companies – and espe-
cially their information security experts – because they can improve compliance and con-
sequently the state of cybersecurity within the organization.
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1.2 Research gap
There is large body of IS research on the topic of technostress. However the concept of
security-related stress (SRS) (also dubbed information security stress (ISS), but the term
security-related stress will be used for the purposes of this thesis as it’s abbreviation is
more distinct from other information systems abbreviations) is fairly new with only a few
studies written on it to date (D’Arcy et al. 2014; Ament & Haag 2016; Lee et al. 2016).
All of these studies have found that security-related stress does indeed exist in organiza-
tions and is one of the roots for noncompliance issues. Additionally, all of these studies
have studied the phenomenon of SRS quantitatively through questionnaires, which leaves
the research gap of qualitative research on SRS to be filled.
It is largely agreed upon by all of the previous SRS research that the topic needs to be
further studied. Lee et al. (2016) state that their study should be used as a cornerstone for
future information security stress research, and suggest future research on organizational
factors  mitigating  SRS as  well  as  the  management  side  of  the  phenomenon.  Ament  &
Haag (2016) point out that their research is a “first test of the security-related stress con-
struct” and that further research on the topic is needed to find out how stress affects other
areas than just information security policy (ISP) compliance, for example individual
productivity, performance or job satisfaction. Ament & Haag (2016) also suggest future
research on the link between SRS and technostress, and state that a more objective study
that focuses on a single organization is needed, since their own sample was very broad
and the data collected was based on the subjects’ own perceptions as they answered the
questionnaire. D’Arcy et al. (2014) also suggest a more objective approach to future re-
search as it may reveal new insights and supporting details to the already discovered re-
sults.
This thesis will be addressing the research gap by approaching the phenomenon with
a qualitative study using interviews. As all previous research has been done through ques-
tionnaires, it is important to understand the phenomenon more broadly through qualitative
research. By studying the phenomenon of SRS through interviews, the result  will  be a
deeper and more thorough understanding of end-users’ attitudes and concerns towards
stressful information security practices. This thesis will answer to the future research need
expressed by both Ament & Haag (2016) and D’Arcy et al. (2014) of a more objective
study focusing on a single organization. The interviews could also reveal some new as-
pects of SRS that have yet to be discovered.
7
1.3 Research questions
This research is focused around three research questions which will be answered through
a literature review and an empirical study. The research questions, which have been de-
signed to answer the main question of how organizations can improve their information
security practices to reduce SRS, are as follows:
1. What do technostress and security-related stress have in common?
2. Why and how do employees experience security-related stress?
3. How can organizations improve their information security practices to prevent and
reduce security-related stress?
1.4 Scope of the study
The  interviews  will  be  conducted  with  employees  from  the  University  of  Turku.  The
scope is limited to a single organization, as previous research on SRS has identified the
need for a more controlled sample of subjects (Ament & Haag 2016). Additionally, the
focus will be on employees who are end-users of the information security policy within
the organization, not the security experts. The information security experts will be ex-
cluded from the scope of this study, because the aim of the study is to find out how infor-
mation policies and practices affect the employees and therefore the organization.
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2 TECHNOSTRESS
In order to explore the phenomenon of security-related stress, it is important to first un-
derstand the underlying concept of technostress. In the first scientific paper on tech-
nostress (Brod 1982) the concept is defined as stress arising from the inability to handle
new technologies introduced to the workplace. Another early definition of technostress
by Caro & Sethi (1986) defines technostress as uncertainty caused by the need to adapt
to technological change, and therefore focuses more on the perceptions of inability rather
than reactions to not being able to handle the technologies. While technostress can still
today be considered as stress from having to adapt to and being anxious about new tech-
nologies, the phenomenon has gotten new depths as technology has become a standard
tool for everyday work used ubiquitously throughout the organization (Tak & Park 2016).
This chapter will review the existing literature on technostress, divided into two sections.
The first part will present the causes and consequences of technostress both at the indi-
vidual and at the organizational level, and the second part of the chapter will present
possible ways of combatting technostress in organizations.
2.1 Technostress: causes and consequences
Numerous studies on technostress have been conducted with both a broad scope as being
examined in the workplace in general (ie. Tarafdar et al. 2007; Ragu-Nathan et al. 2008),
and from a more specific point of view with a focus on specific professions such as tele-
workers (Suh & Lee 2017) and librarians (Ahmad et al. 2012), or on different areas of
technology, such as mobile phones (Hung et al. 2011) or social media (Brooks & Califf
2017). According to Ragu-Nathan et al. (2008), technostress as a modern phenomenon
can be attributed to three characteristics of the contemporary work environment depicted
in Figure 1. First of all, employees are becoming more and more dependent on the con-
stantly developing technologies to make decisions. Second of all, there is a knowledge
gap between the existing competencies of end-users and the competencies needed to op-
erate the new, increasingly sophisticated information and communication technologies.
The third contributing characteristic is the shift from traditional working conventions to
modern, more flexible ways of working (virtual teams, remote work etc.).
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Figure 1 Three characteristics of the modern workplace contributing to the
existence of technostress (Ragu-Nathan et al. 2008)
2.1.1 The five technostress creators
In their research, Tarafdar et al. (2007) identify five factors as the main creators of tech-
nostress in end-users. These five factors – techno-overload, techno-invasion, techno-com-
plexity, techno-insecurity and techno-uncertainty – have been widely accepted in tech-
nostress literature, and have thus become the cornerstone of empirical technostress re-
search (ie. Ragu-Nathan et al. 2008; Hung et al. 2011; Shu et al. 2011; Fuglseth & Sorebo
2014; Sellberg & Susi 2014; Srivastava et al. 2015; Fischer & Riedl 2015). Techno-over-
load is related to the change in end-users’ working pace, namely the expectation to work
faster because technology makes it possible. Techno-invasion describes the stress that
arises from constant connectivity enabled by ICTs and the feeling of responsibility to be
connected at all times. Techno-complexity refers to the insecurity created by sophisticated
systems, which make end-users feel incompetent. Techno-insecurity is the fear of job loss
due to automation or more techno-savvy workforce. Techno-uncertainty comes from the
knowledge that ICTs are constantly developing and therefore end-users’ own skills can
become obsolete. (Tarafdar et al. 2007.)
Even though a large portion of technostress literature is based on the classification by
Tarafdar et al. (2007), other theories and stressors have also been found. Ayyagari et al.
(2011), for instance, take a different approach to the classification of technostress crea-
tors. They study the effects of specific technology characteristics, such as constant con-
nectivity and the dynamic fast-changing nature of technology, on five different tech-
nostress creators which they have dubbed work overload, role ambiguity, job insecurity,
work-home conflict and invasion of privacy. While the names of the stressors are to some
extent different, similarities in their definitions can be found and will be explored in the
following chapters. Fischer & Riedl (2015) add to the list of technostressors by Tarafdar
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et al. (2007) with techno-unreliability, meaning the instability that comes from systems
malfunctioning, breaking down and lagging, which leads to employees not being able to
fully rely on the technologies they use. According to Shu et al. (2011), technology de-
pendence – which refers to the degree to which end-users are dependent on computer
technologies to finish their tasks – can also increase technostress.
Figure 2 The five technostress creators identified by Tarafdar et al. (2007)
Being the most widely used basis for technostress (and consequently security-related
stress) research, the classification of stressors by Tarafdar et al. (2007) depicted in Figure
2 will also be used for the purposes of this thesis. Techno-overload is the result of em-
ployees simply having too much to handle due to technology – be it too much work, too
much information or too many simultaneous tasks (Tarafdar et al. 2007). Information
systems can cause situations wherein employees are, for example, forced to work much
faster as they are expected to accomplish more in less time with the help of the technolo-
gies, or are given more work than they can efficiently handle (Shu et al. 2011). Another
reason for techno-overload could be the fact that end-users have to spend a significant
time adapting to or learning new information systems, which takes up time from their
actual tasks and leads to overload (Tarafdar et al. 2011). Ragu-Nathan et al. (2008) point
to the constant stream of never-ending information as the main creator of techno-over-
load. Users are continuously multitasking and trying to handle information from various
sources, which often results in inefficiency (Young, 2004). The need to multitask creates
stress in end-users, as they are exposed to more information than they can productively
process. In addition, technology can cause addiction: for instance the use of mobile ap-
plications can become compulsive, meaning that a user checks their phone many times a
day for no reason, and lead to technostress (Hsiao 2016). The vast amounts of information
also lead to end-users not knowing what to prioritize anymore. Ayyagari et al. (2011) also
point out that a major factor causing techno-overload is the frequency at which new tech-







tired of having to constantly adapt to the fast pace of change in the field of technology
and of having to change the way they work, and may start perceiving the new systems in
a negative fashion instead of seeing the opportunities that lie within them. This is espe-
cially true with technologies that exceed the skill-levels of employees.
Techno-invasion occurs due to the fact that technology enables users to be constantly
connected, blurring the line between work life and personal life (Tak & Park 2016). The
constant connectivity that is enabled by new technologies leads to end-users feeling as
though they are always at work (Hung et al. 2011). Knowing that it would be easily pos-
sible to read and answer e-mails during holidays or evenings makes employees feel as
though they should be doing so, and can even be experienced by employees as an invasion
of their privacy (Ayyagari et al. 2011). Technology is therefore invading users’ personal
lives (Tarafdar et al. 2011). Tak & Park (2016) call employees who are faced with such
issues “connected smart workers”. Ayyagari et al. (2011) identify another stressor closely
related to techno-invasion called work-home conflict – referred to as work-life conflict
by Tak & Park (2016) – which stems from the increasingly common practice of working
from home.  As  employees  are  able  and  at  times  even  encouraged  to  work  remotely,  a
clear distinction between work life and home life ceases to exist. This might result in there
being no end to the working day on days when work is done remotely, or in turn work
continuing at home on days spent at the office, creating so called ubiquitous technostress
(Hung et al. 2011). Going even further, techno-invasion can also result from the social
pressure that is caused by the connectivity (Booker et al. 2014). The perception that col-
leagues are constantly checking their emails in the evenings for instance causes anxiety
in employees.
According to Tarafdar et al. (2007), the increasing complexity of technologies that are
being developed can lead to anxiety in end-users. An employee may feel inadequate and
incompetent simply due to the inherent complexity of the technology (Ahmad et al. 2011;
Fuglseth & Sorebo 2014). Complex technology usually comes with a set of complex jar-
gon, which end-users may find intimidating (Chandra et al. 2015). While many compa-
nies provide supporting documents such as manuals or other study materials to end-users
to aid them in understanding the systems, these materials are often not designed with the
end-user in mind, and end up being too complex and too lengthy. This in turn may make
the user feel even more stressed out than before reading them (Ragu-Nathan et al. 2008).
Brod (1982) states that end-users may experience low self-confidence regarding their
skills and jealousy over other users who seem to have a better grasp on the technology.
All of this leads to the inability to solve problems with the new technologies. Tarafdar et
al. (2011) note that techno-complexity is also closely linked to techno-overload, because
when end-users have to spend vast amounts of their time trying to learn and understand
how to efficiently use systems they find complex, it  takes time away from their  actual
work, increasing their workload.
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Techno-insecurity is defined in technostress literature as either the fear of technology
changing the job market and therefore threatening the job security of employees (Fuglseth
& Sorebo 2014), or as arising in end-users when they feel threatened by the skills of their
coworkers, who they feel have a better grasp of the technology (Ahmad et al. 2011; Chan-
dra et al. 2015). Living under constant fear of being replaced by someone or something
more competent is stressful, and may lead to employees pretending to possess skills they
don’t have (Tarafdar et al. 2007). According to Spacey et al., (2003) ever since the dawn
of the new technological era, news about robots and technology stealing jobs has caused
workers to feel discomfort as they contemplate whether their job will be safe in the future.
Techno-insecurity may create a vicious loop in an organization, as employees keep infor-
mation from their peers and refuse to share their skills out of fear of becoming obsolete
as their co-workers learn the same things (Tarafdar et al 2011).
Techno-uncertainty occurs as employees are under pressure to keep up with the latest
technologies, when there is no way of knowing when they have to move on to a new
system again (Tarafdar et al. 2007). Employees are constantly being introduced to new
technologies, which leads to a loss in stability in working patterns. Fuglseth & Sorebo
(2014) add that techno-uncertainty can also arise from having to face constant upgrades
of original software and hardware. This, according to Ragu-Nathan et al. (2008) creates
uncertainty in end-users, because it generates ambiguity in current job demands and
makes the future job demands unpredictable. Chandra et al. (2015) find that the short life-
cycles of today’s technological commodities cause frustration in employees as their skills
regarding any certain technology may become obsolete at any time. Ayyagari et al. (2011)
identify another ambiguity stressor called “role ambiguity”, which can be considered a
cross between techno-overload and techno-uncertainty. Role ambiguity arises from hav-
ing to multitask with different systems and tasks, and not knowing what to prioritize.
Trying to focus on a job task and being constantly interrupted by e-mail notifications or
phone calls on other topics can lead to not knowing which task is the most important. The
problem is getting more serious as the sources of interruption in the workplace are in-
creasing and the workforce is getting older and more sensitive to such interruptions (Tams
2011).
2.1.2 Consequences of technostress on individuals and organizations
Fischer & Riedl (2015) find it ironical that while ICTs are usually introduced to decrease
stress in employees by automating and making work easier and faster, through tech-
nostress they end up having the opposite effect. This is in information systems literature
often referred to as the “dark side of ICT” (Tarafdar et al. 2011; Fischer & Riedl 2015;
Srivastava et al. 2015; Salah-Eddine & Bleaissaoui 2016). Technostress has been found
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to have a variety of different consequences at both the employee and the organizational
level (Hung et al. 2011; Okebaram & Moses 2013).
Fischer & Riedl (2015) attribute technostress experienced by employees to five ante-
cedents, which represent the present state of the organization: individual characteristics,
job characteristics, the technological environment, the organizational environment and
the social environment. As agreed by other researchers (ie. Shu et al. 2011; Ragu-Nathan
et al. 2008), individual characteristics such as age, personality or subjective perceptions
of situations that are affected by a lack of information have a major influence on tech-
nostress experiences. Job characteristics, which determine how difficult or demanding an
employee’s tasks are, are another determinant of technostress (Suh & Lee 2017). The
technological environment includes the technologies that have been adopted to an organ-
ization and how they are managed, including how often they are changed or how reliable
their use is. The organizational environment refers to the physical and organizational at-
mosphere (layout of the office, company culture and level of technical support) of the
company and the social environment to the atmosphere that is created in social interac-
tions. (Fischer & Riedl 2015.) Brooks & Califf (2017) study the effect of social media
use at work, and find that employees using social media during working hours is detri-
mental to productivity due to social media induced technostress impacting the mental
wellbeing of employees. According to the researchers, this interesting finding also speaks
to the fact that as technology is changing, organizations are no longer just responsible for
making sure that technostress from their own technologies is in control, but also taking
into consideration technologies that the company doesn’t provision to the employees.
When it comes to individual characteristics, Brod (1982) states that prior experiences
with technology and how in control end-users are of technology largely determines
whether or not they will experience stress due to technology. Srivastava et al. (2015) find
that personality traits, such as an employee’s level of neuroticism or extraversion affect
exposure and reactivity to technostress. Ragu-Nathan et al. (2008) study the effect of four
individual characteristics – age, gender, education, and computer confidence – on whether
or not a person will experience technostress. They find that as education and computer
confidence increases, users become less inclined to experience technostress. However,
their initial assumptions about age not being a factor and women being more inclined to
experience technostress than men is proven wrong. Their study reveals that technostress
actually decreases as users get older, and that males experience more technostress than
females. In respect to the surprising finding about age, Ragu-Nathan et al. (2008) propose
that older professionals have better stress-management skills and more power over the
choice of using information systems in the workplace and therefore are less prone to ex-
periencing technostress. Tams’ (2011) findings are in contradiction with this conclusion,
as they suggest that older generations are more sensitive to interruptions, and conse-
quently technostress arising from interruptions does increase with age. Regarding gender
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differences, Ragu-Nathan et al (2008) suggest that a possible explanation could be the
fact that women use less information systems in their work roles than men. Viswanath &
Morris (2000) find that when choosing technologies and systems, women are more likely
to focus on ease of use while men make their decision based on their perceptions on how
useful the technology will be. This is in line with Tarafdar et al’s (2011) finding, as tech-
nologies that are easier to use cause less techno-overload and techno-complexity.
Tarafdar et al. (2011) classify the individual consequences of technostress into two
categories, the psychological and the information system use related outcomes. Psycho-
logical outcomes include decreased end-user job satisfaction and decreased end-user
commitment, as well as increased role conflict and increased role overload. Job satisfac-
tion decreases as end-users keep experiencing and trying to handle technostress at the
workplace. Tak & Park (2016) find that technostress mostly affects job satisfaction indi-
rectly through work-life conflict, which refers to the constant connectivity enabled by
technologies. The negative feelings that arise are linked to the organization, even though
they are outcomes of frustration towards technology, and thus a decrease job satisfaction.
According to Ragu-Nathan et al. (2008) the biggest organizational consequence of tech-
nostress is that it leads to a decrease in employees’ commitment to the organization and
to their intention to stay, however differing opinions exist as well. For instance, Ahmad
et al. (2012) find no correlation between the two phenomena. Role conflict refers to end-
users experiencing contradicting requirements in their work (Okebaram & Moses 2013),
and technostress increases role conflict by creating situations where these contradictions
become more apparent (Tarafdar et al. 2011). Role overload, which refers to having too
many tasks or tasks that are too difficult in comparison to the expectations and the skills
of the employee, is increased in employees who are stressed due to technology (Wang &
Shu 2008).
The information systems use related outcomes of technostress include decreased user
satisfaction with specific information systems, decreased user productivity when using
systems, and decreased user innovation in the use of systems (Tarafdar et al. 2011). User
satisfaction with information systems decreases for instance when users don’t know how
to best benefit from systems, when systems crash or when data is lost. Owusu-Ansah et
al. (2016) study the effects of technostress on commercial banks and find that employees
are experiencing anxiety and have a very negative attitude towards information systems
at their use. The results also show that technostress causes decreased performance as the
banking professionals are having trouble adapting to the fast-paced technological change,
and that having to constantly learn new systems and spending time trying to solve mis-
takes that come from not being familiar with a system decreases end-user productivity.
This finding is in line with a study by Tarafdar et al. (2010), where end-user satisfaction
in the context of technostress is also proven to depend on how positive end-users’ per-
ceptions are towards the technologies they use in their daily work. Innovation, meaning
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experimentation and coming up with new and exciting ways of making use of information
systems, is decreased when end-users are experiencing technostress (Fuglseth & Sorebo
2014).
Ahmad et al. (2012) emphasize that the effects of individual consequences of tech-
nostress  directly  also  affect  the  organizational  consequences  of  technostress,  as  happy
employees are more committed to the organization. At the organizational level, tech-
nostress can be manifested as absenteeism, conflicts between employees, overall em-
ployee dissatisfaction and disloyalty towards the organization, all of which can be detri-
mental to organizational productivity (Caro & Sethi 1986). Suh & Lee (2017) find that
there’s a direct link between how employees at a teleworking company experience tech-
nostress and how valuable they are to the organization in terms of productivity. Work
overload, invasion of privacy and role ambiguity along with the fast pace of technological
pace are proven to decrease the teleworkers’ satisfaction. Hung et al. (2011) study ubiq-
uitous technostress, meaning stress that is caused by the universal presence of technology
in organizations, and find that not only does such stress exist, but that through increasing
role stress, ubiquitous stress also has a negative effect on productivity.
As is the case with individual consequences, organizational consequences can also
vary depending on what kind of organization is in question. Tarafdar et al. (2015) study
technostress in the context of sales professionals, and find that technostress creators neg-
atively affect sales performance and technology-enabled innovation. They show that, for
example, techno-overload experienced by sales professionals when having to input cus-
tomer information into a sales support system or a CRM system takes up valuable time
from the actual selling, hence leading to a loss in performance. Sales employees could
also feel inadequacy due to techno-insecurity, which leads to anxiety towards the systems
and prevents the sales professionals from being innovative in their work.
It is important to keep in mind that technostress can also have positive consequences
in the organization, in the form of technoeustress (Ahmad et al. 2012). End-users perceive
technostress creators in the workplace in different ways, which – depending on users’
personality traits – leads to either distress or eustress. Organizations could leverage the
fact that personality traits have an influence on how employees react to technostress cre-
ators as either distress or eustress. Giving complex and jobs to employees who perceive
challenges as opportunities rather than as stressful events will decrease technostress in
the organization (Srivastava et al. 2015). Managers can keep this in mind already when
drafting job descriptions for example.
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2.2 Ways of combating technostress
After exploring the consequences technostress has at both the individual and the organi-
zational level, it is clear that something needs to be done to prevent technostress from
manifesting itself in an organization. Technostress literature has identified so-called in-
hibitors which act as moderating tools to reduce technostress experienced by employees
(Young 2004; Ayyagari et al. 2011; Fuglseth & Sorebo 2014; Srivastava et al. 2015; Pirk-
kalainen et al. 2017). Figure 3 showcases the most common inhibitors of technostress
mentioned in research, which are continuous training, technical support provision, user
involvement facilitation, supporting end-user innovation and systematically managing
technostress.  Caro  & Sethi  (1986)  emphasize  the  high  importance  of  top  management










Figure 3 Ways of combating technostress
Perhaps the most widely accepted suggestion in technostress literature to prevent and
control technostress is to provide continuous training on the systems and technologies
that end-users find stressful (ie. Spacey et al. 2003; Hung et al. 2011; Fuglseth & Sorebo
2014). According to Spacey et al. (2003), training becomes successful when it is tailored
to the needs of the employees, keeping in mind that different types of needs may appear
in different groups of employees. Tarafdar et al. (2011) state that providing training and
supporting documents for system use increases users’ system skills, which in turn directly
reduces techno-overload, techno-complexity and techno-insecurity which are mainly
caused by not understanding the systems. Spacey et al. (2003) stress the importance of
continuous training, instead of occasional one-time training sessions, to make sure that
end-users feel confident about their skills in the long run and acknowledge why new sys-
tems are implemented. The knowledge that training is always available and that it is a key
value of a company also helps with techno-uncertainty, because employees feel as though
they will be supported in situations where new technologies are introduced. Techno-in-
vasion could be prevented by setting clear guidelines to when users should be answering
e-mails for example, and training users on the company human resources policies where
these guidelines are explained. A recent example of such a policy is the “right to discon-
nect” that was enforced by the French government in 2017, which obliges all companies
with over fifty employees to draft into their code of conduct a clear rule against sending
e-mails during out-of-office hours (bbc.com 2016). Spacey et al (2003) note that while
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training is one of the best methods in influencing end users and helping reduce tech-
nostress, poor training can have the opposite effect of what is the desired outcome. Ac-
cording to the researcher, having an inadequate trainer may even induce technostress as
users either get the feeling that the technology is even too complex to master by a profes-
sional or that they don’t have support available. As noted by Okebaram & Moses (2013)
training might also be perceived by the employees as overloading, if it doesn’t occur at a
convenient time or if it takes away from productive working time. Hung et al. (2011)
support the idea of not only training employees on technical capabilities but also on cop-
ing with technostress, as their results showed that for instance ubiquitous technostress can
be addressed through training on employees on overall stress management, because tech-
nostress can be closely related to role stress.
Technical support provision, especially easily approachable and supportive helpdesks,
can have a significant effect on reducing technostress, because it lessens the burden of
end-users to have to solve problems by themselves (Fuglseth & Sorebo 2014). If it is
made easy for an end-user to ask and get answers for their technical issues with the sys-
tems, it dramatically decreases the anxiety and stress that is caused by the systems. Users
no longer feel as though they have to spend significant amounts of time figuring out how
to solve problems on their own, and can therefore focus more on their own work. Users
are  also  less  inclined  to  make  dramatic  mistakes  if  they  know  help  is  easily  available
(Tarafdar et al. 2011). According to Tarafdar et al. (2015) organizations should also make
sure that the organizational environment is such that promotes support. Sellberg & Susi
(2013) point out that support needs to be something that is available constantly, and give
as an example organizations where employees are working (and expected to use technol-
ogy) around the clock, but technical support provision is only available during normal
office hours. Salanova et al. (2013) find, that in addition to technical support, negative
effects of technostress can also be counterfeited by social support from colleagues or
managers. A good environment makes users feel comfortable asking for advice and as-
sures that there is no stigma in needing to ask for help. The negative perceptions of having
to constantly keep oneself up to date with new technologies are lessened when end-users
know that there is effective support available whenever new systems are introduced. (Sa-
lanova et al. 2013.)
User involvement facilitation means giving end-users the chance to participate and be
involved in the planning, development and implementation of new technologies into an
organization, already defined as a necessary step in ICT implementation in the 90s (Blili
et al. 1998; Clark & Kalin 1996). Technostress decreases as users are familiarized with
systems prior to using them (Hung et al. 2011). By being involved in the adoption process
of new technologies, end-users are less likely to feel that the new technologies cause dis-
ruptions in their work as they are aware of the implementation schedule and reasons for
the introduction of the systems (Spacey et al. 2003). Okebaram & Moses (2013) give the
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example of not including bank workers in the automatization of bank processes in the 70s
and 80s, describing it as a major mistake because it distanced the workers from the tech-
nologies right from the beginning. First of all, such distancing could have been avoided
through involvement facilitation, as users would have been able to get more familiar with
the systems from the get-go, giving them confidence in using the systems and making the
new technologies feel less complex. Secondly, by involving users in the introduction of
a new system, users are able to express what they need from the system and see how this
corresponds to what the system can offer. When the requirements are clear, users don’t
need to spend an excessive amount of time figuring out what the system can be used for
but instead find the system useful and informative. Thirdly, the involvement mechanisms
help end-users know what is going to change in the work environment through the intro-
duction of the new ICTs, giving them the feeling of control over the change. The percep-
tion of control in coping with technostress is also discussed by Pirkkalainen et al. (2017),
who find that so-called “IT-control”, meaning the level of control an end user has over
using a certain technology, can help mitigate the negative consequences of technostress
because users feel that it is their choice to use the system. This also helps users plan ahead
and predict the changes that are about to come, and decreasing uncertainty. Wang & Shu
(2008) suggest that perceived organizational support – meaning how much the employee
believes he or she is given support if need comes – helps in alleviating technostress. This
is an interesting finding, because it speaks to the effect the work environment’s ambiance
can have on an individual.
Salo et al. (2017) emphasize “that IT users should not be depicted as helpless sufferers
of technostress whose mitigation depends solely on external or organizational mecha-
nisms”, but that employees can themselves have an effect on how they experience stress.
The researchers present three mitigation types, including stressor reduction (transforming
old habits that cause stress), stressor toleration (transforming the way in which the em-
ployee personally reacts to the stressor) and recovery from strain (going offline). A sim-
ilar idea is behind innovation support, where change management is facilitated, because
introducing new technologies to an organization also means introducing new working
methods to end-users (Tarafdar et al. 2010). In a parallel way, Young (2004) states that
the key to reducing technostress is to find the balance between how technology can be
consumed and  how it  consumes  the  user.  In  helping  to  find  a  balance  in  dealing  with
technostress, users should be aware of which aspects of technology are stressful. Users
can then start focusing on the problem areas. For instance, if an employee notices that
technology-enabled multitasking is something that is creating stressful situations in their
work, they should pay attention to slowing down and focusing on one thing at a time.
Having end-users innovate ways which would help them learn and adapt to the new ways
of working more efficiently reduces stress that would otherwise arise from the changes.
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Organizations should provide an organizational environment that encourages experimen-
tation. By encouraging end-users to explore the systems and innovate new ways of using
the systems, users are able to learn how to use the systems at a deeper level, which lessens
the insecurity they feel towards the technology. (Tarafdar et al. 2011.)
Finally, reducing technostress in organizations requires support from management in
order to be successful (Caro & Sethi 1986). Okebaram & Moses (2013) state that since
the antecedents of technostress often come from organization-wide developments, such
as introducing new technologies or changing the working environment by automatizing
something, the management of the changes is extremely important. All the inhibiting fac-
tors of technostress – from training to technical support and from to involvement facili-
tation innovation support – are either unenforceable or ineffective if top management is
not invested in making them successful.
Table 1 ties together the research findings on creators and consequences of tech-
nostress along with ways of combatting the negative consequences of the phenomenon.
The following chapter presents the findings from similar aspects on security-related
stress, which are summarized in Table 2 to facilitate answering the first research question
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Cybersecurity is getting more attention than ever before, with widespread ransomware
attacks bringing the operations of organizations to a halt, presidential elections being tam-
pered with and governmental classified information being stolen by hackers (Cate et al.
2017). According to Gartner’s (2017) predictions, the global year-over-year growth of
information security spending will be 7% ($86,4 billion) in the year 2017 and up to 7,6%
more ($93 billion) the following year. Information security is an actual and growing threat
in organizations worldwide. Companies are using considerable amounts of money to se-
cure their data, but at the same time the employee – who is often considered as the weakest
link of the organization (Angermeier et al. 2009; Aurigemma 2013) – is neglected in the
process. The poor implementation of information security practices to the organization
has brought rise to a new field of technostress research, so-called security-related stress
(SRS) (D’Arcy et al. 2014; Lee et al. 2016; Ament & Haag 2016). This chapter will in-
troduce the concept of SRS by reviewing the scarce amount of previous research on the
topic (D’Arcy et al. 2014; Lee et al. 2016; Ament & Haag 2016) combined with related
stress and information security research in the field of information systems.
3.1 A conceptualized model of security-related stress
SRS in the field of ISS can be defined as employees’ stressful reactions to information
security practices, requirements and incidents (Ament & Haag 2016). An example of a
situation where information security can result in stress is when an employee finds the
information security policy (ISP) filled with jargon, time consuming to go through or too
difficult to understand. Similarly, SRS can be the result of an employee hearing discon-
certing news about security breaches or data loss from the media. In their conceptualized
model of SRS, Ament & Haag (2016) identify six stressors causing security-related stress
in three different environments (Figure 4). The work environment causes SRS in the form
of complexity, overload and uncertainty. Invasion of privacy is a stressor in the personal
environment, and conflict and news are security-related stressors in the social environ-
ment of an employee.
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Figure 4 A Conceptualization of SRS used by Ament & Haag (2016)
3.1.1 Security-related stress and the work environment
Security-related stress in the work environment can be attributed to three different stress-
ors – already familiar from technostress research (Tarafdar et al. 2007), but with different
definitions  for  SRS  –  which  are  complexity,  overload  and  uncertainty  experienced  by
employees in the context of information security (Ament & Haag 2016). SRS can arise
from both the managerial and the technical information security efforts of the organiza-
tion (Lee et al. 2016). Managerial information security consists of creating information
security processes and policies and improving security behavior, while technical infor-
mation security consists of technical security measures, restrictions and applications.
D’Arcy et al. (2014) define SRS complexity as stress that arises from information se-
curity requirements being too difficult to understand or to comply with, causing the em-
ployee to either have to invest significant amounts of time in trying to understand the
requirements  or  to  have  to  guess  which  is  the  right  course  of  action.  An example  of  a
situation where an employee might experience stress due to the complexity of a require-
ment is one where he or she has to check the policy to make sure they are not violating
any rules, but finding it filled with technical content or jargon. Stahl et al. (2012) study
information security policies in the UK healthcare sector, and find that indeed there are
significant amounts of jargon and ambiguity in the policies, making it unlikely for em-
ployees to have a consistent and clear understanding of what is expected of them. The
jargon in the policies is very technical and clearly not written with the healthcare profes-
sional in mind. Such requirements, which are hard to understand and may be interpreted
in many ways, can according to D’Arcy et al. (2014) result in employees having to spend
a long time in finding what they are looking for or simply not understanding how to act.
Ament & Haag (2016) give the example of an employee having to connect to the com-
pany’s private network from outside the organization but not knowing how to do so due
 Work Environment  Social Environment





to complex steps that are not explained clearly enough. SRS complexity can cause invol-
untary security breaches by employees who would want to comply but do not know how
to, according to Guo (2013) so-called “non-malicious security violation”.
D’Arcy et al. (2014) define SRS overload as the result of information security require-
ments causing extra workload for employees and taking time away from their actual work.
According to Herath & Rao (2009), employees may also decide to ignore the information
security policy – not solely because it adds to their workload – but also because it’s more
convenient to act in another way. Ament & Haag (2016) find in their research that pass-
word management in the modern-day work environment is the most significant cause of
SRS overload, as employees are constantly forced to think of, remember and update dif-
ferent passwords for different systems. Hedström et al. (2011) find that while often the
information security practices of an organization are built and communicated in a control-
based top-down manner, they should rather be built using a value-based approach which
considers the values of the employee in the information security guidelines. The research-
ers use the healthcare sector as an example, where often the number one values of the
employees concern the patient’s health, which sometimes leads to the healthcare profes-
sional breaking information security guidelines by prioritizing fast treatment. If the values
of the healthcare professional were taken into consideration in the information security
policy and requirements, and the use of secure passwords for instance would be explained
through the safety of the patient,  the message in the information security policy would
become easier to resonate with. Another example of an information security requirement
causing overload are preset access restrictions in a system, which require having to always
go through a helpdesk or someone who has administrative rights to a system to get work
done (Ament & Haag 2016). Similar loss in productivity is caused by automatic system
updates which might catch the employee by surprise mid-task causing loss of work or
loss of time in case the update is lengthy, or simply interrupt the employee’s workflow
(D’Arcy et al. 2014).
Interruptions in workflow caused by information systems or technology in general
have been proven to lead to lower quality decision-making and negative attitudes towards
the causes of interruption, ultimately causing stress in end users (Speier et al. 1997). Work
overload results especially from technical security requirements (Lee et al. 2016). Tech-
nical security requirements – as opposed to managerial security requirements – are tech-
nical security protocols, such as administrative limitations and data restrictions that can
take away considerable time from actual work. Lee et al. (2016) suggest that technical
security measures, while often inevitable for an organization – should be adopted gradu-
ally in order to prevent work overload. Often when a new technology or system is intro-
duced to an organization, it brings along new security protocols and rules to follow, and
if they are all introduced at one go, they might feel overwhelming. The constant adoption
of new security measures may lead to so-called compliance burn-out (El-Den et al. 2014),
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meaning employees – even those who are morally engaged to follow guidelines – getting
exhausted of having too many requirements to learn and comply with.
The  third  stressor  of  the  work  environment  –  SRS uncertainty  –  refers  to  the  stress
caused by the fast-paced development of the information security environment and there-
fore requirements (D’Arcy et al. 2014; Ament & Haag 2016). Employees are expected to
keep themselves up to date on the information security requirements of the organization,
but this task becomes more and more difficult as constant technological development,
changes in legislation around information security, and the adoption of new systems
forces the organization to constantly revamp existing requirements. A good present-day
example of a stressful information security update, that has already caused a lot of uncer-
tainty before even being implemented, is the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
enforced by the European Union coming into effect in May 2018 (Murtaugh 2017; Al-
brecht 2016). According to Gartner (2017), the new regulation has caused panic in Euro-
pean and multinational organizations alike, reflected in the fact that up to 65% of all in-
formation security spending decisions are driven by the GDPR. The new regulation
causes many changes and updates, affecting all companies that collect or use data, and
the consequences of not implementing those changes to the organization’s information
security policy and further into the work routines of employees can have severe monetary
consequences: the sanctions are up to 20 million euros or 4% of the annual turnover of an
enterprise (Hoyle 2017).
3.1.2 Security-related stress and the personal environment
In the context of technostress, Tarafdar et al. (2007) identified techno-invasion as the
result of technology enabling users to be constantly connected, and blurring the line be-
tween work life and personal life. The constant connectivity that is enabled by new tech-
nologies leads to end-users feeling like they are always at work. The feeling of knowing
that it would be easily possible to read and answer e-mails during holidays or evenings
makes end-users feel as though they should be constantly available. This leads to tech-
nology invading users’ personal lives (Tarafdar et al. 2011). Invasion of privacy as a
stressor in the information security context is linked to employees’ concerns about being
monitored and having their privacy violated (Lee et al. 2016), which is in fact more in
line with the definition of techno-invasion by Ayyagari et al. (2011) from technostress
research, as Ayyagari et al. also see techno-invasion as stress that comes from an end user
feeling as though their privacy is being violated by technology. Employees are concerned
that their information security behavior – and overall behavior on the Internet and in dif-
ferent communication technologies at work – is being monitored without their knowledge
(Ament & Haag 2016).
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According to Lee et al. (2016) information security measures place too much focus on
monitoring employees’ information security practices and compliance activities, leading
employees to feel that their privacy is being invaded. The researchers suggest a selective
and targeted approach to information security compliance monitoring. This means that
organizations should take a different approach to monitoring employees with different
levels of access to systems and data. The reasoning behind selective monitoring is that if
employees are all monitored in the same way regardless of their job roles, then the prac-
tice  of  monitoring  seems  random  and  unrelated  to  the  actual  end  result  of  wanting  to
secure data and information assets of the organization. An employee who is working in
human resources and has access to all employee data should be monitored on a different
level than an employee who doesn’t have any access to employee or customer data. With
the former, the closer monitoring of information security compliance is justified, whereas
with if the latter is still monitored in the same fashion may feel that it is unnecessary and
invasive (Lee et al. 2016). Ament & Haag (2016) go as far as to suggest that if employees
are well trained on information security practices, they won’t need to be monitored at all.
Ament & Haag (2016) theorize that two additional stressors in the personal environ-
ment – job insecurity and degree of freedom (not represented in the conceptualization in
Figure 4) – could be contributing factors to security-related stress. Job insecurity as the-
orized by Ament & Haag means employees fearing job loss due to insufficient infor-
mation security skills. Degree of freedom, both in the sense of not having enough freedom
or having too much freedom in decision making regarding information security is sug-
gested as a contributor of SRS. A situation where information security limits the degree
of freedom is when a security requirement restricts the amount autonomy, innovation or
experimentation an employee can do in their work. On the other hand, if the employee
has too much freedom and responsibility in making information security related deci-
sions, they might feel that they aren’t equipped to make such decisions and don’t want to
be held responsible for decisions they weren’t comfortable making in the first hand. While
Ament & Haag (2016) don’t find adequate support for job insecurity or degree of freedom
in their study, they suggest retesting both suggested stressors in the future as information
security develops in organizations.
3.1.3 Security-related stress and the social environment
The research by Ament & Haag (2016) identifies and validates two stressors which have
not been taken into account in technostress research, but rather can be considered distinct
characteristics of security-related stress. Stress that arises from conflicts means stress that
is  the  result  of  conflicting  expectations  employees  face  in  their  work.  For  instance,  an
organization’s information security policy could mandate employees to only use internal
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company communication channels when dealing with work-related information, but an
employee’s supervisor would ask for details on a specific work-related case through a
social media channel such as Facebook or WhatsApp. This is an example of a security-
related conflict, where the employee is put in the stressful situation of having to choose
whether to comply with the information security policy or the supervisor’s expectations.
Another conflict situation could arise from stigma related to employees strictly following
the information security policy.
Security-related stress can also be the result of news, such as reports about security
gaps or breaches in or outside the organization (Ament & Haag 2016). In the context of
SRS, “news” include any information absorbed regarding information security be it from
the media, from conversations with colleagues or from social interactions outside of the
work environment. Employees might for instance hear about a security gap in a system
they are using at work or get news of another employee being fired due to a misuse of
company data and wonder if they are themselves being compliant of the company’s in-
formation security requirements. A good recent example of such news is that of the two
biggest ransomware attacks in history breaking out consecutively in the summer of 2017.
First in May and then in June of 2017, the two outbreaks – WannaCry and NotPetya –
caused panic and uncertainty around the world (theguardian.com, Cate et al., 2017). Both
ransomware attacks exploited a vulnerability in an old version of Windows, meaning that
only systems that had not been updated were affected (heavy.com). An interesting finding
that made by Shackelford (2017) about the two attacks was that NotPetya used the same
vulnerability as WannaCry, meaning that even after as rude an awakening as WannaCry,
some organizations still failed to update their systems. A possible explanation could be
found from the study by Herath & Rao (2009), where the finding was that in fact, em-
ployees often tend to underestimate the chances of a security breach happening in their
specific organization.
According to Anderson et al. (2016), there’s a clear inconsistency in how users are
worried about their information security and how they are using preventive measures or
reacting to security warnings or security software updates, dubbed by the researchers as
“a discrepancy between security intentions and behaviors”. For instance users often ig-
nore updates or security messages sent by security software because they have grown
accustomed to these messages. This so-called “habituation to security warnings” which
leads to ignoring critical information security practices/prevention measures can accord-
ing to Anderson et al. (2016) be prevented by developing the user interface (UI) and user
experience (UX) design of security systems. Instead of addressing the problem through
time consuming trainings and information sharing sessions, the problem could be ad-
dressed by choosing information security vendors which have taken such things into con-
sideration.
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In conflict with Shackelford’s (2017) and Anderson et al.’s (2016) findings regarding
security behaviors, Ament & Haag (2016) find that employees who experience SRS from
conflict and news are more likely to follow the information security policy and be more
compliant. In theory this would mean that stressful information security practices in the
form of conflict and news may enhance employees willingness to follow the company’s
information security policy.
3.2 Ways of combatting security-related stress
Chapter two presented training, technical support, management support, user involvement
in system development and innovation involvement as methods of combatting tech-
nostress in end-users. While security-related stress literature to some extent suggests the
same methods as its antecedent to combat the negative effects of SRS, a different ap-
proach needs to be taken for instance with security trainings (Ament & Haag 2016). More-
over, in addition to the aforementioned methods, SRS literature suggests the improvement
of the information security policy, communicating requirements visually and recognizing
security-related behaviors as field-specific reducers of SRS.
The information security policy plays an important role in combatting security-related
stress. D’Arcy et al. (2014) emphasize the importance of making the information security
policy as end-user friendly as possible. The first mistake designing an ISP is having it
contain a myriad of technical terms or security jargon that is only understood by infor-
mation security experts (D’Arcy et al 2014; Ament & Haag 2016). The vocabulary needs
to be easy to follow, designed with the weakest link of the organization – the employee –
in mind. Instructions on how to comply and what is  expected from the side of the end
user need to be made as clear and detailed as possible. El-Den et al. (2014), suggest that
users shouldn’t have to always refer to the information security policy when they need to
check security requirements and compliance instructions. The key compliance infor-
mation and most critical requirements should rather be present in the organization through
educational posters or leaflets with infographics around the office. Simple wording and
pictures make the message go through more effectively.
Guo (2013) presents four broad level security-related behaviors that manifest them-
selves in an organization. These behaviors – which organizations should strive to recog-
nize to better understand how information security requirements are being perceived and
complied with amongst employees – security assurance behavior (SAB), security com-
pliant behavior (SCB), security risk-taking behavior (SRB) and security damaging behav-
ior (SDB). The two first behaviors, SAB and SCB, both protect the information security
of an organization, as SAB is an active and preventive form of security behavior and SCB
a behavior that is in accordance with the ISP of the organization. The two latter behaviors,
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(SRB and SDB) are both behaviors that are a cause for concern in the organization. Se-
curity risk-taking behavior means non-malicious but intentional breaking of the security
rules, for instance taking the risk of sharing passwords or writing passwords down. Secu-
rity damaging behavior is malicious and intentional behavior that is aimed at harming the
organization, such as stealing company data.
According to Guo (2013), while SCB should be made into the norm in any organiza-
tion  as  it  means  complying  with  the  given  requirements,  the  SAB activities  should  be
rewarded and promoted. Signs of SRB and SDB need to be detected and watched out for.
SDB means that an employee is purposefully harming the organization through infor-
mation security misconduct, and this type of behavior should not be present in the organ-
ization. However SRB, due to the fact that it is non-malicious, is common in organizations
and can be changed through education. D’Arcy et al. (2014) suggest addressing the issue
of what they call “cognitive rationalization mechanisms” meaning employees justifying
their own information security policy violations much like in security risk-taking behav-
ior head on. This can be done through emphasizing that each employee has a responsibil-
ity towards securing company data, that there is no instance wherein violations can be
justified, and finally that violations can result in reputational and financial consequences
as well as direct consequences to employees or customers.
Figure 5 Four information security behaviors and how to address them (Guo
2013)
As is the case with technostress, SRS can also be addressed through training (D’Arcy
et al. 2014; Lee et al. 2016; Ament & Haag 2016). Employees attitudes towards infor-
mation security compliance are linked to their perceptions of how much of a threat a
breach in information security actually is to them (Lee et al. 2016). This is why trainings
should not only focus on what not to do and how to protect the employee and the organi-
zation from security threats, but also on educating employees about the threats and their
possible implications. Karjalainen & Siponen (2011) study the design of information sys-
tems security trainings, and find that a special approach should be taken when conducting
information security training sessions. The widely accepted training method, suggests that























1. Involving concrete experiences
2. Engaging reflective observation
3. Supporting formation of abstract concepts and generalizations
4. Enabling active experimentation
The first phase encourages participants to consider their own concrete experiences and
attitudes towards information security practices in the company. For instance, employees
can start by reflecting upon their use of passwords. An example of a concrete experience
could be that an employee finds it frustrating to have to have five different passwords for
different systems or for instance admit that they use the same password in all systems.
After individual level reflection, the training moves on to the second phase where partic-
ipants share and discuss their experiences in small groups. The discussion in the second
phase is guided pedagogically by the trainer asking questions such as why are certain
security and measures practices implemented into the organization and what could be the
implications of not following information security protocols. Therefore instead of lectur-
ing about the importance and reality behind information security measures in a company,
participants are coming up with the reasons on their own. D’Arcy et al. (2014) support
the importance of users’ involvement in the design of information security requirements
especially to combat SRS overload. If employees are included in the process of creating
the information security policy, they’re less likely to find the measures taken as a burden,
but rather actually see the meaning behind these measures. In the third phase of the infor-
mation security training as designed pedagogically by Karjalainen & Siponen (2011),
employees’ personal and collective experiences are reflected towards the actual guidance
and policies of the organization. The idea is to examine the actual information security
policies of the organization and see how they differ from personal or shared experiences
and compliance. As a result, groups are able to identify those parts of the information
security policy that clash with the reality. The final phase of the training, enabling active
experimentation, aims at creating concrete instructions based on the discussion, that the
participants commit to following. The idea is to create the instructions as a compromise
between the past experiences of the participants and what is expected of them in the pol-
icy. This means that changes are actually being made also on the side of the organization
as well to facilitate rightful compliance activities. Having a trusted colleague as a dedi-
cated resource to help employees both with technical information security issues as well
as consult in case the employee doesn’t know what to do helps in relieving complexity,
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Table 2 Summary of SRS environments and stressors from scientific
literature
In a similar fashion as for technostress in chapter two, Table 2 summarizes the key
findings from scientific literature on security-related stress. As both the literature on tech-
nostress and security-related stress and have now been reviewed, the first research ques-
tion of what the two areas of stress have in common can now be answered. The following
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part of the thesis will present the research design and empirical findings of the research
in order to get clarity on the two latter research questions on why and how employees
experience security-related stress and how organizations can improve their information
security practices to prevent and reduce such stress from arising.
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4 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DESIGN
This chapter will introduce the chosen research approach and the methodological choices
of this thesis, along with a description the data collection and analysis procedures used.
This research will use the qualitative research approach and it will be conducted as a semi-
structured theme interview. The design of the research is illustrated in the operationaliza-
tion chart (Table 3).
4.1 Research approach and methodological choices
As the aim of this research is to go deeper into analyzing the subjective, personal experi-
ences of individual employees than all previous SRS research which has been done quan-
titatively through questionnaires, the qualitative research method is the appropriate
choice.  Furthermore,  out  of  the  many different  types  of  qualitative  research  –  such  as
grounded theory, phenomenology and ethnography – narrative analysis will be used for
the purposes of this thesis. According to Merriam (2014), narrative analysis uses stories
of experiences told in first-person form as data. Narrative research is often used for in-
stance in biographical research where interviewers ask the interviewees to tell their life
stories (Flick 2009). The data collected through interviews for this study can be consid-
ered narrative, as the interviewee gives answers through stories, feelings and experiences
related to the phenomenon that is being studied.
An interview can be described as a conversation between the interviewer and the in-
terviewee, in which the interviewer initiates and leads the conversation to get insights on
the interviewee’s thoughts (Eskola & Suoranta 1998). For this research paper, data will
be collected through individual face-to-face interactions in the form of theme interviews
using the semi-structured interview method. In a theme interview, the interviewer divides
the topic into different themes and makes sure all the same themes are covered with all
the interviewees (Paavilainen-Mäntymäki 2017). Usually a theme interview does not in-
clude pre-drafted questions, but when mixed with a semi-structured interview method,
the questions are made before-hand. According to Brinkmann (2013) face-to-face inter-
views give the richest data if analyzed properly. This is due to the fact that the face-to-
face interview gives the interviewer additional insight from for example the non-verbal
communication signals of the interviewee and the atmosphere of the discussion. For the
purposes of this research paper, an individual interview will be the method of choice, as
the topic of information security and stress can be sensitive and personal to the partici-
pants.
The operationalization chart (Table 3) below acts as a framework for planning the em-
pirical research of this thesis. The table illustrates the purpose of the research and the path
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from the research questions to the interview questions. As the interviews will be con-
ducted as theme interviews, the appropriate themes are listed in the right-hand side col-
umn. It is also worth mentioning that since the first research question (“What do tech-
nostress and security-related stress have in common?”) is addressed in the literature re-
view in chapters two and three, it is not included in the operationalization table.
Table 3 Operationalization chart
Purpose of the research: To find out how organizations can improve their information security
practices to reduce security-related stress amongst employees
Research
Question
Theoretical background Sample questions Themes





(IS) will not be achieved if
employees perceive elements
of behavioral information se-
curity or even a company’s
entire information security




Do you feel as though there
are constant changes in the
information security prac-
tices of your organization?




What reactions do reports
about information security














 “The behavioral security re-




tudes and beliefs, and work-
place context, to name a few,
to employees’ security com-
pliance decisions.” (D’Arcy
et al. 2014)
What could make you feel
more confident about your
information security skills?
What would you wish to be
changed in the information
security policy to make it












The data for this research paper is collected by interviewing members of the staff of the
University of Turku. As a large organization with many different job roles, the University
of Turku has many different information security end-user profiles, which makes it ideal
for getting a broad understanding of the negative effects of information security practices
on different parts of an organization. The interviewees are chosen on the basis of their job
roles, with the aim of getting as many different profiles as possible. When choosing who
to interview, the number of interviewees was approximated by estimating how long it will
take until the answers between the interviews start to repeat themselves. Twelve persons
were approached, out of which nine answered affirmatively. The interviews were con-
ducted within the time span of four weeks, and varied from thirty minutes to an hour in
length. The final interviewees are listed in table 4. All interviews were recorded. As can
be seen in the third column of table 4, while the job roles vary, there are comparatively
more interviewees with an academic role (professor, lecturer or researcher) as the study
aims to get as realistic of a sample of the employees in the environment of the University





Job role Duration of interview
(rounded to closest
quarter of an hour)
Interviewee 1 2 Planning officer for educational affairs 30 min
Interviewee 2 10 Executive secretary 1 hour
Interviewee 3 5 Professor 30 min
Interviewee 4 4 Departmental coordinator 30 min
Interviewee 5 5 Communications director 1 hour
Interviewee 6 5 Adjunct professor 30 min
Interviewee 7 4 University lecturer 45 min
Interviewee 8 5 Post-doctoral researcher 1 hour
Interviewee 9 6 University lecturer 45 min
Table 4 Interviewee profiles
The interview was constructed out of four themes, which are illustrated in table 5. The
four themes were chosen on the basis of the two research questions, of which the first is
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divided into three categories according to Ament & Haag’s (2016) conceptualization of
security-related stress.
Theme Description
SRS and the work environment The complexity, overload and uncertainty caused
by organizational security practices and policies
SRS and the personal environment How information security practices invade the
privacy of employees
SRS and the social environment Effect of conflicts and news on security-related
stress in employees
Preventing and reducing SRS Ways to make information security practices eas-
ier to understand and follow
Table 5 Description of interview themes
The interview questions (Appendix 1) were drafted in a semi-structured manner, using
the survey questions of Ament & Haag’s (2016) empirical study as a basis. The interview
questions  were  open,  as  is  typical  for  a  semi-structured  interview.  The  interview  was
structured to first find out the background of the interviewee’s information security skills
and knowledge as well as the interviewee’s attitudes towards the information security
practices and policies of his or her organization. The interview then continued with ques-
tions about security-related stress experienced by the interviewee in the different envi-
ronments  (work,  personal  and  social)  and  finally  concluded  with  the  interviewee’s
thoughts on how information security practices and policies could be made less stressful.
All in all, the interview consisted of twenty questions, which were asked in either Finnish
or English, depending on the preferences of the interviewee.
4.3 Data analysis
In the context of research, data analysis aims to mine the most important findings related
to the research question out of the research data (Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka
2006). There are numerous different approaches to qualitative data analysis, which all
have  the  goal  of  studying  the  data  in  a  systematic  fashion.  In  this  research  paper,  the
primary data gathered from the interview was analyzed using the deductive content anal-
ysis method, which according to Tuomi & Sarajärvi (2009) consists of the reduction of
data, the categorization of data and the abstraction of the results to fit the theoretical back-
ground of the phenomenon.
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The first part of the deductive content analysis as defined by Tuomi & Sarajärvi (2009)
is devoted to the reduction of data. In this study, the interview is first transcribed, checked
and then read three times with different focuses. The first reading is to get a general idea
about what the main ideas of the interview contain. The second reading is devoted to
highlighting the most important findings of the interview, and the third to extract the main
findings into a separate document. As the interview is conducted in either Finnish or Eng-
lish, the third part of the reduction process also includes translating the transcript into one
common language. The second part of the analysis – the categorization of data – is made
easier as the data is collected in the form of a theme interview. According to Saaranen-
Kauppinen & Puusniekka (2006), thematization is a natural choice of analysis method for
analyzing data gathered through theme interviews. In this method, the transcribed data is
organized according to interview themes. The structure of the findings and discussion of
this research paper follows the structure of the interview conducted. The final part of the
deductive content analysis is the abstraction of data. This means looking at the data and
comparing it with previous scientific theories (Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka 2006).
As the research model is based on two previous studies by D’Arcy et al. (2014) and Lee
et al. (2016) combined with Ament & Haag’s (2016) own findings and technostress re-
search, which are mirrored to the findings from the interviews.
4.4 Evaluation of trustworthiness
While the trustworthiness of quantitative research is often measured through the concepts
of reliability and validity, these are not as such directly applicable to evaluating the trust-
worthiness of qualitative studies (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008). According to Lincoln &
Guba (1985), the trustworthiness of a qualitative study can be measured using four dif-
ferent criteria: credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. The trustwor-
thiness of this research paper will be viewed through the lens of these four criteria.
The credibility of a qualitative interview study can be determined by critically as-
sessing whether the conclusions drawn from the how trustworthy the subject of the inter-
view and his or her opinions are. According to Merriam (2014), the qualitative research
approach adds the risk of biases and other human weaknesses to the trustworthiness of
the study, as the researcher as well as the subject of the interview play a large role in
collecting and interpreting the data used for the research. According to Eriksson & Ko-
valainen (2008), credibility means that if another person were to read the text, they would
come to the same conclusions. Transferability refers to the level of similarity between
different studies and research on the same topic (Lincoln & Guba 1985). Due to the fairly
new nature of the phenomenon of security-related stress, transferability is ensured be-
cause this research paper is built on all previous research available on the topic, and the
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results are examined in parallel with the previous research. The whole outline of the in-
terview, as well as the theory, is exclusively related to all existing research on the same
topic. Dependability of a qualitative study means the extent to which the results of the
study would be similar if the study were to be conducted in another context (Lincoln &
Guba 1985). In the case of this research paper, dependability is ensured through the in-
terview questions, have been drafted in a way that they can be asked at any organization
where a security policy exists. However as the concept of stress is something that is ex-
perienced in a different way depending on each individual (Srivastava et al. 2015), and
as organizations have different types of information security policies, there is no guaran-
tee that the results of the study – if it were to be conducted in a different environment –
would be exactly the same. Dependability can also be viewed through how transparent
the research process is (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008). Finally confirmability – which is
the  level  of  objectivity  of  the  research  –  can  be  evaluated  by  assessing  if  any  bias  or
underlying motivations affect the results of the study (Lincoln & Guba 1985). Any bias
from the part of the researcher is mitigated in this research through attempting to analyze
and evaluate the results of the research against the backdrop of previous research and the
theoretical background used.
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5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This chapter will present the results of the empirical study and discuss their connection
to previous scientific literature on the topic of security-related stress. The results are pre-
sented under the four themes introduced in chapter four – SRS and the work environment,
SRS and the personal environment, SRS and the social environment, and preventing and
reducing SRS.
5.1 SRS and the work environment
As identified in previous research (Ament & Haag 2016), the theme of security-related
stress in the work environment consists of complexity, overload and uncertainty. From
the interviews, it became apparent that complexity – which according to previous research
arises from security requirements being too difficult to understand or comply with
(D’Arcy et al. 2014) – was not something that bothered the interviewees, mainly because
they didn’t even know about the existing requirements. The information security policy
was in fact one topic of the interviews that provided nearly unanimous reactions from the
interview subjects. Most interviewees had not read the information security policy, but
there  were  some  instances  where  parts  of  the  policy  had  been  looked  at  to  find  some
specific guidance on a certain topic. The fact that the information security policy was not
even familiar to the interviewees is something that has not been considered in previous
research on security-related stress. The general attitude towards the information security
policy was quite dismissive. For example, one employee had browsed through the docu-
ment to find out the university policy regarding the use of cloud storage services, but even
in that case the interviewee chose to not follow the instructions clearly stated in the policy.
Another employee had read the policy out of obligation due to being a member of the
university’s steering group on security, but couldn’t recall in any way how it was struc-
tured or what it entailed. Even if an employee did remember having seen the information
security policy at one point or another, they quickly went on to say they had no idea what
is was like. Most of the interview subjects either didn’t know if such a document existed
or knew of its existence but had never felt the need to seek it out.
“Somehow it would be really nice if there was some kind of specific guid-
ance somewhere. Might be that there is, I just haven’t happened to find it”
“I have no idea, well I think like I can’t really even say if it exists and
where you could find it – I can’t answer to either of those questions”
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A very common opinion seemed to be that since the university is filled with so much
information  and  so  many  documents,  it  was  unreasonable  to  think  that  the  employees
would have time to go through all of them. Employees were more likely to go with their
gut feeling when it came to security, or purposefully not pay attention to any information
security rules because they didn’t find them necessary, which is in line with the findings
from Herath  & Rao (2009).  A good example  of  the  phenomenon came from an  inter-
viewee who – as a side note – mentioned that she always left her computer unlocked with
all systems running, but didn’t even recognize that such behavior could somehow be
harmful to information security. When asked whether or not there was any guidance on
how to dispense students’ grades for instance, one employee stated that the guidance
probably does exist, but that he had no idea what the university’s policy on that was and
that it would require the employee to actively go read about it somewhere – which was
too much to ask.
“I don’t follow that stuff, or like where you can find what, the university is
full of all kinds of documents that have nothing to do with everyday work”
Employees  seemed  to  therefore  be  experiencing  information  overload  on  a  general
level in their work environment, which in turn lessened their interest and capacity to han-
dle  information  security  related  information.  This  issue  of  information  overload  in  the
organization was very apparent, and seemed to cause frustration within the employees no
matter which position they held. One possible explanation for the negative attitude to-
wards having to go through any additional information in their work could be in the nature
of the work of an organization such as the university. As employees are usually teachers
and experts in their specific field, and have to constantly read new content such as re-
search or student essays, they may have even more information presented to them than
would be the case for employees of other types of organizations. One employee, who
represented the other side of the coin as her job role entailed communicating about various
different topics to various different stakeholders, emphasized the importance of com-
municating things in the right tone to the right target group at the right time. She felt that
a topic like information security could easily be made into something scary, and often
ended up being dramatized to an excessive degree, which in turn took away from its cred-
ibility. On the other hand, she did recognize that there was a need to communicate about
information security in general in the organization to raise awareness and make sure that
the employees know which things to pay attention to.
In terms of information security in specific causing work overload in employees, some
good examples– which correspond to the findings from previous research on the topic –
were given by the research subjects. An employee described a common nuisance that she
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faced in her work, where due to security restraints she did not have access to certain in-
formation in a system she often used, and therefore had to always ask for the information
from someone who did have access. The interviewee found the situation frustrating and
inefficient, because in any case the information was always provided to her, but still she
was not allowed access to the system. Such addition to workload from access restrictions
was also identified in the research by Lee et al. (2016) and Ament & Haag (2016). An-
other example of work overload came from an interviewee who had started working on a
research project which had already been granted funding, but then got cancelled at a very
late stage due to one of the lawyers from the project contractor’s side deciding that the
project couldn’t be continued as they weren’t sure their data was completely safe. The
researcher had ended up going through policy documents to try to find answers to ques-
tions, but hadn’t found any information that would’ve suited his purposes. Similar situa-
tions, where security-related stress comes from having to invest significant amounts of
time in going through and trying to understand security requirements, are described in
research by D’Arcy et al. (2014). The situation described by the interviewee could be
characterized as the very worst-case scenario for such situations, as the time invested in
trying to understand the security materials ended up being time wasted as no answers
were found and the project ended up not being rolled out. The third instance where infor-
mation security added to workload, ultimately causing a security conflict was one where,
for research purposes, a researcher had to play a certain game, which the university end
point  protection  didn’t  allow  access  to.  As  the  interviewee  was  unable  to  turn  off  the
protection because it was managed centrally in the organization, he had to take his home
computer, turn off the virus protection and play the already questionable game without
any computer protection. Such non-malicious violation of the security practices has also
been identified in the research by Guo (2013).
Despite the examples of information security overload identified in the interviews,
most employees felt that information security was hardly anything they ever thought
about, meaning that it was more likely for them to ignore anything that would add to their
workload rather than take the time to find out how to act. There were also instances de-
scribed in the interviews that matched those of previous research – such as an employee
having to always dispose of certain sensitive materials after reading them – which were
seen as such an instilled part of the employees’ work routines that the interviewees didn’t
find them to be a burden. In that sense D’Arcy et al.’s (2014) finding of overload from
information security leading to employees having to take time away from their actual
work did not apply, since employees felt that information security was part of their actual
work. A possible reason for hardly thinking about information security or even ignoring
it altogether could be a lack of realization of the consequences of security breaches. Em-
ployees seemed to be working in their own silos and it could be sensed that because they
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knew that someone else was in charge of information security in the organization, em-
ployees also felt that whatever breaches might happen would not be traced back to them
because it would in the end be the fault of the information security officer.
The third SRS stressor in the work environment – uncertainty – has in previous re-
search (D’Arcy et al. 2014; Ament & Haag. 2016) been found to arise from the constantly
changing security requirements that are required due to the fast pace of technological
change. From the interviews it became apparent that there was already so much uncer-
tainty regarding the existing security requirements, that the interviewees simply didn’t
have the interest or the capacity to keep up with what and how the information require-
ments were changing. On the other hand, any such changes weren’t even being commu-
nicated, at least in a way that would have caught the interviewees’ attention. A common
opinion was that the interviewees had never received any communication about either the
information security policy or any changes related to it. The findings on security-related
uncertainty are therefore not in line with previous research on security-related stress. For
instance with the upcoming GDPR, most interviewees had never heard about the univer-
sity’s stance on the new regulation. Those who had heard of some initiatives from the
university to react to the changes brought along by the GDPR were persons who were
somehow involved in defining how the reform will affect the university. The interviewees
who felt as though they had never received any communication about the information
security policy or changes to it, were also quick to disclaim the statement by bringing to
light the issue of the university having so much information generated and communicated
on a daily basis that it was impossible for an employee to process all of the information.
This finding binds together the two stressors of uncertainty and overload, because the
same constant stream of information is mentioned as one of the causes of techno-overload
from technostress research as defined by Ragu-Nathan et al (2008).
“Well I have to say now that it feels as though these changes are just hap-
pening somewhere else and like I’m not getting any information on them
and I don’t know how to somehow start to educate myself or follow what’s
changing, so no it doesn’t feel like it’s something that affects me”
In fact, while the stressor of uncertainty is mainly defined in both SRS- and tech-
nostress research as something that is caused by change (D’Arcy et al. 2014; Ament &
Haag 2016), the general feeling from the interviews was that more uncertainty from in-
formation security was caused due to a lack of knowledge, guidance and control. In all
interviews, at some point each of the interview subjects in one way or another stated that
they are aware that they should probably be more aware when it comes to securing their
data. In the same way, interview subjects seemed quite embarrassed about their lack of
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knowledge which points to the fact that they felt as though they felt that they should have
been aware of the answers.
“And then it made me feel a little like I should probably know something
about this when you asked me [for an interview] or that should I somehow
know way more about this really”
When asked how confident the employees felt about their own information security
skills, there was a lot of uncertainty to be sensed. None of the interviewees felt that they
were completely confident when it came to own information security skills, however most
subjects stated that they weren’t especially worried either. An interesting finding regard-
ing employees’ information security practices was that all interview subjects seemed to
feel to some extent that they were not responsible for information security, but rather that
information security was the responsibility of their employer.
“…and I haven’t really thought about whether or not I could send this or that
[regarding salary information] and then I feel that it’s the university’s responsi-
bility that if someone breaks into the system that it’s not like my then… or that
my head won’t be on the chopping block”
Another common theme in the answers was that since they had never had to face any
major information security issues, employees felt that their current knowledge – which
all subjects identified as very limited – was sufficient for the time being. The effect of
having been victim to security breaches earlier on current information security behavior
is something that has not been touched before in SRS research. It was very interesting to
see the internal struggle experienced by interviewees on this topic, as there was a certain
inconsistency and illogical nature in the answers. The phenomenon seemed ubiquitous:
at the same time not being too worried about information security, but feeling insecure
about own information security skills and feeling as though one should be more compe-
tent when it came to information security.
“I still kind of feel that I’m quite bad in some sense, like I don’t think about
information security stuff too much somehow that like maybe I’m able to
avoid the biggest pitfalls but… then I’m pretty satisfied I haven’t noticed
that I should care more”
Nearly all of the interview subjects stated that they had no idea what to do in case an
information security breach were to happen. There was a clear conflict between how the
employees felt that they should be more aware and more competent in their information
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security practices, but at the same time finding themselves not caring enough to do some-
thing about it – also identified in the research by Lee et al. (2016). Interviewees also
mentioned that they were worried about the future of information security as they realized
that in it’s current state it is not really taken seriously in the workplace. This has not been
taken into consideration in previous research in security-related stress.
”… I don’t take [information security] for granted though, somehow I
mean that it’s like something that comes as services develop and digitali-
zation develops, then through that development the role of information se-
curity will also in my opinion grow”
Overall, the empirical findings of SRS in the work environment from this study found
factors that were in line with previous research, factors that contradicted previous research
and entirely new areas of stress that could be further studied. Contradictory to previous
research (D’Arcy et al. 2014), complexity did not appear as a stressor in this study, mostly
due to the fact that employees had not read any information security materials to begin
with, let alone find them complex. Similarly, uncertainty as a stressor in the work envi-
ronment was not perceived as in previous research as arising from constant change
(D’Arcy et al. 2014; Ament & Haag 2016), but rather from not having enough know-how
or knowledge on security issues and ways of combatting such issues. A finding that was
in line with previous SRS literature (Herath & Rao 2009; Guo 2013) was that employees
were engaging in non-malicious security breaches. However, in previous research this
has been linked to the stressor of complexity (D’Arcy et al. 2014), while in the realms of
this study, it seemed that the cause of non-malicious incompliance was in fact overload.
Previous findings on information security overload (Lee et al. 2016; Ament & Haag 2016)
were to some extent supported by the findings of this study, for instance in terms of hav-
ing to spend significant amounts of time in trying to understand what is expected or being
faced with access restrictions which caused extra workload to employees. However, this
research also brought to light a previously neglected area possibly affecting information
security compliance, which was the overall information overload affecting employees’
capacity to process security-related information.
5.2 SRS and the personal environment
In previous research, SRS in the personal environment has been found to be caused by a
stressor dubbed by Ament & Haag (2016) “invasion of privacy”. Research has shown that
SRS could stem from employees feeling as though their privacy is being invaded when
their employer is monitoring their information security behavior (Lee et al. 2016). In the
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empirical findings of this study, employees did not know whether their employer was
monitoring their information security behavior, however all of the interviewees felt that
it was a realistic possibility. This – referring to the incomplete knowledge of whether or
not such monitoring is happening – is in fact exactly what has been defined as the core
reason for SRS in the personal environment by Ament & Haag (2016). One employee,
who used to run another business alongside his university position, described a situation
where the other business’ e-mail address was linked to his university e-mail in a way that
allowed for all the incoming e-mail to come to the same mailbox. The IT department had
noticed that there was unusual incoming traffic to his e-mail, and contacted the employee
to ask what was going on.
“They came from the helpdesk all serious asking what’s up with you hav-
ing some, you have this e-mail profile and I was like okay this is what it is,
well in my understanding it wasn’t even a problem, I don’t know, well
maybe it was like an indication of them observing…”
The employee remembered at the time wondering to what extent the organization was
monitoring him, but found it hard to believe that they would go to the extent of looking
at the websites he visits for instance. He strongly felt that the right thing to do would be
to inform people of such activities and be as transparent as possible if monitoring was
going on. On the other hand, another employee felt very nonchalant about the idea of the
organization monitoring her, as she believed that none of the information she had on her
computer or her phone – both of which she also used as her primary personal devices,
which  meant  that  all  her  personal  information  was  also  stored  in  them  –  would  be  of
interest to anybody. From the interviews in general, it seemed that the more concerned an
employee was about the organization monitoring them, the more security conscious they
also were about other issues.
An interesting finding was that the range of different opinions when it came to the
question of whether or not it would violate an employee’s privacy if the organization
would be monitoring the employee, was very wide. While some felt that the act of moni-
toring was a complete violation of their privacy and fully unacceptable, others either
didn’t care about it or even found monitoring necessary. One interviewee was of the opin-
ion that as long as the organization was acting under the Finnish law, it would even make
the employee feel more secure if the organization was monitoring its employees’ behav-
ior, because it would mean that all suspicious behavior would then be investigated. An-
other employee very strongly stated that it would be an invasion of his privacy to monitor
his behavior on the Internet, but also found it hard to believe the organization was doing
such activities. A key finding from the side of SRS and the personal environment was
that none of the employees really knew whether or not such monitoring was happening
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from the side of their employer, which also caused them to have to guess. Not knowing
exactly what was being monitored made interviewees feel uneasy and confused. This is
in line with Ament & Haag’s (2016) finding that the stress that is caused by invasion of
privacy comes specifically from not knowing whether or not the employer is engaging in
monitoring activities.
“Well actually I don’t’, umm this is also one of those things that I don’t
really know exactly but I would assume that yeah some kind of, some kind
of monitoring… or I mean I don’t think that anyone is reading… or in a
sense yes but I don’t really know what it means in practice”
One of the interviewees shared an experience which had made her cautious of the IT
department and everything they had access to. The employee was faced with a fundamen-
tal technical issue with her computer, so she took it to the helpdesk to be fixed. The IT
experts had asked her some technical questions which she hadn’t fully understood, lead-
ing her to accidentally give consent to the computer being fully emptied without backing
up the files.
“It was some word IT uses which I missed that I apparently had then said
okay to, and [my computer] was completely emptied, I lost for instance
two years’ worth of photos. It was an absolutely horrible situation… So
really after being through something like this I’ve become pretty careful
in the sense of what [the IT guys] can actually get to and what it could
mean in the worst-case scenario”
The employee emphasized the outrage that she had felt from the fact that she had been
expected to understand the technical terms used by the information technology profes-
sionals and having been put into the position of having to make a decision when she
clearly wasn’t in the position to make such a decision. The reason why this is so interest-
ing, is because it ties into the theory by Ament & Haag (2016), that has so far not been
supported by quantitative research, that SRS can also result from a stressor called Degree
of Freedom. Degree of Freedom as a stressor in Ament & Haag’s research could derive
from an employee having been given the freedom and responsibility to make decisions
when they don’t feel equipped or confident to make those decisions. The third security-
related stressor in the personal environment, job insecurity, which was also theorized but
not proven by Ament & Haag (2016) did not manifest itself in this study either. Job inse-
curity in the context of SRS was characterized in theory as the fear of losing one’s job
due to not being competent in information security matters.
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All in all, the presence of SRS in the personal environment as defined by Ament &
Haag (2016) as invasion of privacy was supported by this study. However, the findings
also showed that for some employees, the monitoring seemed to have a positive effect on
their level of comfort regarding the status of information security in their workplace. This
has not been found to be the case in previous SRS research. The findings supporting “de-
gree of freedom” as theorized in previous research were a new contribution to the field of
SRS, as earlier studies have not been able to confirm such stress appearing in the personal
environment.
5.3 SRS and the social environment
Security-related stress in the social environment has been identified in previous research
to result from both conflicting expectations regarding security behavior and from discon-
certing news about security breaches (Ament & Haag 2016). When asked to identify sit-
uations wherein the employee had been asked by a superior or a colleague act in a certain
way that the employee knew was contradictory to the information security policy of the
organization, the interviewees were able to recognize such situations from their profes-
sional life. One interviewee described a situation that happened on a recurring basis,
where she was put into a position to have to receive sensitive information about students
in the form of Excels via unencrypted e-mail. The interviewee herself felt that this infor-
mation should have been secured somehow or rather been stored in a secure system, but
because her colleagues at the other university where the material was sent from were not
concerned about any security issues, there was little to be done in the way of changing
their behavior. This is an example of conflicting expectations, which in Ament & Haag’s
(2016) research was described as situations where employees are faced with a conflict as
they are in a way forced to act in a way that disagrees with their own information security
knowledge or standards. Another employee recognized a similar issue, where sensitive
information was stored in an Excel and could easily get into the wrong hands.
“I’ve sent information in these Excels, imagine how vulnerable they must
be since they’re not behind any system… In that way you really could, I’m
sure in many organizations talk about these “Excels” so to say, you can
find those here too”
According to the interviewee, the creation of so-called “shadow registries” was also
something that occurred on an ongoing basis. These registries were employees’ own col-
lections of student, alumni and company information, which were created by employees
to avoid having to always ask for needed information from someone when needed. The
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reason why the interviewee felt this was problematic, was that it led to not knowing how
the information was being used and by whom, as opposed to the correct procedure of
storing the information into a secure system which would always record stamps as evi-
dence of when and by whom information was retrieved. The creation of these shadow
registries was also a problem from the side of data quality, because it meant that certain
employees had different versions of for instance contact information for the alumni be-
cause the information was only updated in the system. This lead to misunderstandings,
not being able to reach the right focus groups and in the worst cases situations where
wrong things were communicated to wrong people. One interviewee described such a
case where an e-mail had gone to a much larger distribution list than it was supposed to,
and remembered the situation as very stressful. Luckily the information in the e-mail had
not been of a sensitive nature, but it was however irrelevant to a lot of recipients who then
opted to respond by demanding to have their contact details removed from the univer-
sity’s registry.
One employee had been in a situation where she had asked for some information about
certain members of a certain user group, and was instead given the entire user registry
with information about all the members. The reason behind being given all this infor-
mation was that the employee’s colleagues said that they didn’t have the time or the re-
sources to start parsing through the long lists for individual pieces of information, and
that she would have to go through the materials herself. As the interviewee characterized
herself as very safety-conscious, she remembered feeling uneasy about the careless way
in which the information was handled and distributed in the organization, because she felt
that she shouldn’t have gotten access to this information.
“But it was kind of one of these situations where I thought that okay this
is how things are done, because I felt that I was in a way a complete out-
sider for even asking for this, of course I’m part of the organization but
not directly in the user group [that would see this information], and then
they decided to go with this solution”
As  Ament  &  Haag’s  (2016)  view  of  SRS  arising  from  conflict  has  been  described
through other people’s expectations conflicting with the information security policy, the
interviews also revealed situations where employees knew they were – for their own rea-
sons – acting against the information security policy, simply because it was much more
practical to do so. This is in line with Herath & Rao’s (2009) finding that sometimes the
information security policy is neglected due to convenience. A common example was the
use of the cloud-sharing environment Dropbox instead of the university’s own cloud en-
vironment even though employees knew that the use of Dropbox was discouraged in the
university’s information security policy. One employee stated that she and her colleagues
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had decided to go against the university’s policy on Dropbox “this one time” because they
felt that the form they were sharing wasn’t that critical. Another employee had decided to
take Dropbox into everyday use because it simply made his work much easier.
“University policy says that we shouldn’t use Dropbox, but I do. The rea-
son for that is that our internal option which is called Seafile doesn’t offer
the options which I need – I can’t share editing rights with externals and I
co-author all the time with people from all around the world”
In fact, the situation described by the employee could also be seen as a conflict arising
as a result of overload, which is a stressor occurring in the work environment first intro-
duced by D’Arcy et al. (2014). Acting according to the university’s information security
guidelines would have added to the workload of the employee, because it would’ve meant
he would have always had to receive different versions of the master document via email,
then update the master document and share it with the other parties.
Another  form  of  conflict  situation  could  according  to  previous  research  (Ament  &
Haag 2016) be stigma from fellow employees from being too compliant when it came to
information  security.  From  the  interviews,  the  employees  were  unable  to  identify  in-
stances where they had seen colleagues have stigma against employees who took infor-
mation security seriously, but rather that if someone was very security aware, people felt
like they should be acting in the same way. There were, however a few mentions of the
interviewees themselves having some stigma against very security-oriented employees.
For instance, one interviewee identified a frustrating situation, where her department had
to collaborate with the IT-department on a project, but whenever asking the IT profes-
sionals to share any information with them, the answer was always no. This lead to the
interviewee feeling as though they were strictly following security guidelines out of spite.
Another interviewee shared an experience from when he first started working at the uni-
versity and was placed in a team where information security was taken very seriously. He
couldn’t understand the point behind taking security so seriously, because he felt that the
information they were producing wasn’t something that needed to be hidden.
“…but I was always wondering, well why? Or like my point was that okay
if we have some information that someone would want, well I do research,
I want everyone to get the information I produce!”
News and reports about security gaps at work or in the technologies the interviewees
used were of interest to the employees, but didn’t for the most part seem to bother anyone
too much. However, many of the interviewees mentioned feeling that they were being
naïve and too trusting with the systems they were using. This is in line with Anderson et
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al.’s (2016) findings of there being an inconsistency between how worried users are about
information security issues and how much (or actually little) effort users are putting into
preventing those issues.
“I don’t really care that much, I should. I mean privacy and security – and
for me security is mainly about privacy – I have some documents on my
computer which shouldn’t fall into generic hands because I do some EU
projects and some of them are… I mean I’ve signed a bunch of NDAs and
stuff…”
 In the same way, Anderson et al.’s (2016) findings about employees growing too ac-
customed to seeing security warnings pop up on their screens for them to have any effect
was also in line with the interview answers. Either employees couldn’t recall how they
reacted to their antivirus software notifications or then they usually chose to ignore the
notifications.
 “Just today I was thinking that maybe before somehow I’ve worried about
[information security] more because there’s been more talk about all the
kinds of risks that exist, and perhaps back then I thought about whether I
would actually know how to act in all those situations. But maybe nowa-
days I think that somehow I’m pretty confident. However in practice it
doesn’t mean… or that maybe it’s just that I’m trusting that the systems
work”
Some examples of reports about information security incidents that were mentioned
by the interviewees included friends’ Facebook accounts being hacked into, backups fail-
ing and lists of passwords into systems being leaked to a wide audience. One interviewee
stated that whenever she read an article about a security incident or a gap in a system she
used herself, she felt as though she needed to go check her settings. This is in line with
Ament & Haag’s (2016) finding that people who experience stress from security news
are more likely to be more security-conscious. Another interviewee described an opposite
reaction to security news, as the employee said that there had been so many rumors about
Whatsapp being hacked into, but they seemed to never be true so he wasn’t bothered by
the news and continued using the application for sharing work-related things without
knowing if it’s allowed.
When it came to reactions to larger security incidents, for instance the two ransomware
attacks of the summer of 2017, the most common opinion was that the attacks felt very
distant and unlikely to happen at the workplace of the interviewees. Most of the inter-
viewees remembered hearing about the security breaches of the summer and thinking
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about it for a second but not feeling worried. One interviewee stated that while he felt a
little worried, it just in fact reinforced his habit of backing up his files on the regular as
not to lose anything if something like this were to happen. This is another good example
of the security-reinforcing side-effects of security-related stress from news (Ament &
Haag 2016). On one extreme, an employee felt that the university didn’t have any money
or sensitive information that would be useful for anyone hacking into their systems, and
that on the other hand even if something were to happen that would destroy files in the
organization, it wouldn’t be too much of a loss because surely the university had backups
for most of the computers. Another, more security concerned employee felt that there was
a very concrete risk for ransomware or other information security incidents happening at
the university and causing damage.
“I remember thinking that what if that had happened to us, I would have
no clue how to act.”
SRS in the personal environment as a theme in the interviews also exposed many of
the employees trusting the university to take care of information security for them. One
interviewee talked about feeling very contradictory, because he relied on the university’s
systems with what he described as naïve trust, all the while knowing that incidents like
WannaCry and Petya do happen all the time. Therefore the research by Ament & Haag
(2016) which found that news of big security incidents that are broadcasted largely in the
media cause stress is valid, however in order for such stress to lead to positive outcomes
such as more compliant behavior as theorized by the researchers, the incidents would
have to be much more relevant to the employee, either by being happening to someone
they know or by affecting a system they use frequently.
On the whole, SRS in the social environment was most in line with previous research
in the field (Ament & Haag 2016; Herath & Rao 2009; D’Arcy et al. 2014; Anderson et
al. 2016) from the three different environments of the conceptual model of SRS. Both
stress from conflicting expectations and stress from security-related news were found to
appear in the interviews, however at most moderately. A new finding that at the same
time agreed with previous research regarding collective stigma against employees who
were considered too security compliant, showed that while some interviewees themselves
admitted to judging their very security-conscious colleagues, employees mostly in fact
appreciated anyone who had any extra knowledge about information security in the or-
ganization. While the stressor of news – especially in the light of recent media coverage
of big ransomware attacks – had made the interviewees worry to some extent, it was not
something that could be considered as a major cause of stress in employees, as they found
it highly unlikely that they would ever be faced with any information security breaches.
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5.4 Preventing and reducing SRS
Prior research on ways of preventing and reducing SRS has considered increasing confi-
dence in security skills, changes to the information security policy, improvements in com-
munication regarding information security and finally training as best practices (Kar-
jalainen & Siponen 2011; Guo 2013; D’Arcy et al. 2014; El-Den et al. 2014; Ament &
Haag 2016). In terms of suggesting ways to feel more confident about their information
security skills, nearly all interviewees mentioned that they wanted to get clarity on infor-
mation security guidance and better communication on what was expected of them. A
common view was that there was very little or no communication about information se-
curity at the university. When asked how information security could be communicated
most efficiently, the interviewees were fast to mention the modes of communication that
did not work – from news on the intranet and generic alerts about obvious phishing e-
mails, to posters on the walls and mentions in the weekly e-mail.
”I really believe that all employees somehow adopt the culture of the place
they work at, so if it [information security] isn’t something that’s talked
about then maybe people don’t understand the significance it could have”
D’Arcy et al. (2014) suggest making the information security policy as user-friendly
as possible, however in the case of the target organization, changing the outlook of the
information security policy would not do much since most people have not read it. In fact,
most of the feedback regarding the structure and language of the policy was surprisingly
positive. One of the interviewees who had read the information security policy mentioned
that even though she still found the current policy quite distancing and hard to get a hang
of, she felt that the IT department had actually improved their output and text generation
when it came to the policy. Another employee said that the information security policy
was quite clear in how it was structured, and a third said that he didn’t have trouble un-
derstanding the policy but that it was written in a very general way that didn’t help him
in his specific situation. In this sense the biggest issue with the information security policy
seemed to be that the content had not been brought to the knowledge of the employees.
One employee hoped for a list of the most common questions and situations to be pre-
sented in the information security policy, because he suspected that his questions about
the GDPR for instance would also be on the minds of his colleagues. In their research,
El-Den et al. (2014) suggested communicating the information security policy to employ-
ees through posters and leaflets with the help of visual aids. This idea was not supported
in the interviews as an effective form of communication, as interviewees felt that posters
and other such material always went unnoticed by the employees.
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None of the interviewees had ever attended an information security training, and the
common perception was that such training wasn’t ever even organized. When asked if the
employees would attend a training on information security, the answers were mostly pos-
itive albeit with some conditions. The employees who felt they would get something out
of the training emphasized that the session would need to be very relevant and concrete,
while bringing some actual value, for instance by being designed for specific user groups
or on a specific topic such as the GDPR. This is in line with the study by Hedström et al.
(2011), where value-based information security management is found to help in getting
the message of the information security practices through. Even employees themselves
stated that it would be easier to understand the need to comply with the university’s in-
formation security practices if it was in line with their primary educational values. Simi-
larly, some interviewees stated that they most probably wouldn’t attend the training, ei-
ther because they had so much going on that they would prioritize something over the
training or find it useless because they wouldn’t be able to remember the information
anymore when it was actually needed. One interviewee said that so far the communication
about security had been so generic and obvious that he felt  as though a training would
most probably be a waste of time for him. These findings were strongly in line with Lee
et al.’s (2016) idea that employees who perceive information security breaches as a true
threat are more likely to comply and want to educate themselves on how to better secure
their information.
“In a sense it is a very interesting field, but if the content is on the level of
like “don’t give your passwords to anyone”, then I wouldn’t go … but this
would be a very relevant topic and like some good performer who would
be able to present what all this means and what the future scenarios are
from the point of view of our practical everyday working life, I would be
interested”
Regarding the content of the security trainings and communication, there were a lot of
suggestions as to what the employees wanted to know. Concrete examples of actual se-
curity threats along with ways to both prevent them from happening along with clear rules
on how to act if something were to happen were things that the interviewees were inter-
ested in hearing. This is in line with the suggestions of Karjalainen & Siponen (2011) as
to what constitutes a good information security training. One interviewee suggested that
the best way of getting the information to sink in would be if every time that some large
security scandal happens, someone would send an information blast explaining what hap-
pened, how the university is protecting itself from similar things happening here and what
an employee can do to prevent such things from happening. Communicating about the
incident when it is relevant will leave a mark in the employee’s mind all the while giving
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a concrete context to the message. One interviewee hoped for someone to tell him why it
was necessary in the first hand for him to be concerned about information security, since
nothing had ever happened to him that would have made him feel as though he wasn’t
secure.
One employee mentioned that they had a concept called “Teacher’s corner”, where
teachers and researchers gathered to discuss and brainstorm on different topics and
themes. The employee felt that it could be a good idea to integrate information security
training into the concept, because it would be a different, more engaging form of training
where employees could learn through discussing amongst themselves. Such a concept
would also be supported by the ideal structure of an information security training sug-
gested in the research by Karjalainen & Siponen (2011), where learning would happen
through the four phases of involving concrete experiences, engaging reflective observa-
tion, supporting formation of abstract concepts and generalization, and enabling active
experimentation.
The findings from this empirical study regarding ways of combatting and reducing
security-related stress were strongly in line with previous research on the topic (Kar-
jalainen & Siponen 2011; Guo 2013; D’Arcy et al. 2014; El-Den et al. 2014; Ament &
Haag 2016). The key finding in terms of what the employees themselves believed would
work to increase their information security knowledge and skills was tailored and relevant
communication. When it came to trainings as a way of reducing stress from information
security issues, employees felt that they would be open to the concept of trainings, but
that in order for there to be any benefit from attending, the trainings would have to be
brought  to  the  level  of  the  employee,  his  or  her  everyday  work  and  only  be  centered
around realistic scenarios and threats.
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6 CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this thesis was to provide insight on the question of how organizations could
improve their information security requirements in order to reduce security-related stress
in employees. The three research questions around which the thesis was built were
1. What do technostress and security-related stress have in common?
2. Why and how do employees experience security-related stress?
3. How can organizations improve their information security practices to prevent/re-
duce security-related stress?
The first question was addressed through reviewing previous scientific literature both
on technostress and on security-related stress. One significant difference between the two
concepts found was that while technostress is examined mostly through stressors –com-
monly divided into techno-overload, techno-invasion, techno-complexity, techno-insecu-
rity and techno-uncertainty – and their effect on environments, security-related stress was
examined through environments from the start. The three environments – work-, per-
sonal-, and social environment – did however include stressors that were present in tech-
nostress  as  well.  Similar  stressors  in  both  fields  included  overload,  complexity,  uncer-
tainty and invasion. The stressor of insecurity, which was identified in technostress liter-
ature was not its own stressor in security-related stress. This was interesting to find, be-
cause form the interviews, it felt as though all the interviewees were very insecure about
their information security skills. Entirely distinct stressors identified in SRS research but
not in technostress research were stress from news and stress from conflict. The similar-












Table 6 Similarities and differences between technostress research and SRS
research
The second research question aimed at finding out how and why employees experience
security-related stress. As such, it seemed that many of the causes and consequences of
security-related stress were a reality in the organization, however the employees did not
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characterize or identify the situations in themselves as stressful. Based on the interviews,
SRS appeared mostly in the personal environment and the social environment, whereas
the security-related stressors of the work environment seemed to have less of an effect on
employees. While some examples of complexity and overload were given by the employ-
ees, they were not considered to be major issues, as the information security policy and
requirements in general seemed to be very distant and unfamiliar concepts to the inter-
viewees. The only stressor that did seem to cause harm in the work environment was
uncertainty. Uncertainty was mainly caused by the lack of knowledge, guidance and con-
trol regarding information security in the work community, emphasized by the fact that
there was very little or no communication about information security in the organization.
Another issue causing uncertainty among employees was worry about future information
security, as employees identified their current skills in information security as poor. The
stressor of invasion of privacy in the personal environment was also a cause for concern
among the interviewees. There was a lot of uncertainty about the level at which the or-
ganization was monitoring the employees’ security behavior. While not all interviewees
felt that it would be an invasion of their privacy if their organization was monitoring them,
it was clear that the monitoring should be transparently communicated. The general find-
ing regarding news as a stressor was that while news about security breaches worried the
interviewees, they felt that it was unlikely for similar security breaches to happen in their
organization. Another finding was that employees seemed to feel as though they should
have been more worried, but that they were naively trusting the organization and it’s sys-
tems to be secure. Conflict regarding security behavior was present in the organization,
both in terms of willingly acting against known requirements and in terms of being asked
to act against the information security policy by a colleague or a boss.
All in all, it was surprising to see the extent to which SRS did exist even in an organi-
zation where employees did not seem especially security-conscious. A possible explana-
tion to this finding, which was reflected in the interview answers, is that due to the exten-
sive technological leaps that are being made in the field of information systems – which
go beyond the understanding of employees – we are not only storing more and more in-
formation about ourselves and our work in a digital format but at the same time in fact
not understanding how the information is stored, what the technologies mean, and what
the risks are. Parallel to this phenomenon is the fact that as technology becomes more
sophisticated, so do the security breaches. Adding to this the constant media coverage of
security incidents, employees and individuals are left with the conflicting notion of hav-
ing to – and even wanting to – trust systems they do not understand all the while under-
standing that the information security-related risks exist.
The third and final research question was also addressed through the interviews. The
key finding about preventing and combating security-related stress was that while em-
ployees wanted to learn and be more informed in information security issues, they found
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themselves falling short and losing interest due to bad communication. As suggested by
literature, the idea of security trainings was supported in the interviews with the condition
that the content would be relevant, understandable and concrete, explaining actual threats.
Persons with more administrative roles in the organization seemed more concerned about
information security than lecturers and researchers.
The biggest theoretical contribution of this thesis is that it provides new insight de-
scribing the appearance of the phenomenon of SRS in an organization, as this is the first
qualitative study to have been conducted on the topic. As the interviewees were encour-
aged to describe situations from their everyday life, the findings also provide SRS re-
search new real-life examples of the stressors– which have so far only been hypothesized
by researchers. The finding that most of the stressors of overload, complexity and uncer-
tainty in the work environment are not considered as true causes of stress by employees
–  at  least  in  the  way they  are  currently  defined  in  the  field  –  is  a  valuable  theoretical
contribution, as it could either point to the idea that different stressors of SRS appear in
different organizational settings, or to the fact that by interviewing employees instead of
studying the phenomenon quantitatively through questionnaires, a broader snapshot of
the phenomenon from the point of view of single employees is revealed.
The practical implications of the findings in this thesis are useful for information se-
curity professionals as well as people in charge of the wellbeing of their organization. As
based on the empirical findings there’s a lack of communication between information
security professionals and employees, this research can act as a glimpse into the thoughts
of the end users, which in turn helps better understand ways to communicate and train
employees and in turn improve the state of information security in the organization. Step-
ping into the shoes of an employee and looking at how information security is perceived
through their  eyes  can  help  practitioners  to  better  tailor  their  message  in  a  way that  is
meaningful to the employee.
The limitations of this research study include the fact that the research concentrated on
the employees of one specific organization in one specific country, which means that the
phenomenon could be perceived differently in other settings. Another possible limitation
is that while the researcher felt that a saturation point was reached with the number of
interviews in this study, stress as a concept is very subjective, meaning that the specific
situations and feelings described by the interviewees in this study could be very different
for a different set of interviewees.
Future research should continue to examine the phenomenon qualitatively to gain a
broader understanding of different views and further validate the findings from this re-
search. The empirical findings of this research paper have first and foremost brought into
light the negligent attitude and uninformed state of employees regarding information se-
curity. While the ignorance and incompliance of information security practices in organ-
izations has been widely studied in the past, future research could address the stress that
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is caused by the non-existent knowledge of information security among employees. Stress
from uncertainty – which so far in SRS research has meant uncertainty from constantly
changing requirements – could therefore be studied as in fact being caused by overall
uncertainty about how to act, what is expected and what information security means. An-
other aspect of security-related stress that is closely tied to the uninformed and nonchalant
attitude of employees towards information security is that of the effects of previous ex-
periences with information security incidents affecting current compliance behavior. As
many interviewees often justified their lack of cautiousness to never having experienced
any issues and therefore not seeing any need to change their behavior, it would be inter-
esting to study the effects and possible remedies of the phenomenon. Regarding SRS in
the personal environment, which stems from employers monitoring employees’ infor-
mation security behavior, further research is needed to understand the effect of the setting
in which the employees are working. The setting in this study was a Finnish university,
where most employees relied on the Finnish law preventing their employer from tracking
their behavior in a way that would harm the employee. The findings could be completely
different for instance in a different country where the trust in authorities and lawmakers
is not as strong.
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Number of years working at the organization:
Background:
1. Can you tell me what types of information security practices you employ in your
work?
2. Can you describe what types of information security practices are expected of
you in your work?
3. How would you describe your confidence-level regarding your information se-
curity skills?
4. How would you describe your feelings/attitude towards your organization’s in-
formation security policy?
Theme: SRS and the social environment (conflict & news)
5. What reactions do reports about information security gaps in your work or in the
technologies you use stir in you?
6. What reactions do reports about information security incidents – for instance the
ransomware attacks of the summer – cause in you?
7. Have there been instances in your working life where you’ve had a conflicting
situation between what is in the information security policy and what is expected
of you by a boss or a colleague? Can you describe the situation?
8. Is there any stigma in your organization about people who strictly follow infor-
mation security rules?
9. How do you react when a security warning or a software update pops up in your
computer screen?
Theme: SRS and the personal environment (invasion of privacy)
10. Is your organization monitoring your information security behavior? If yes:
How does that make you feel? If not: How would you feel if your organization
would monitor your information security behavior?
11. Have you ever felt as though your organization is invading your privacy by con-
trolling your information security behavior? Can you describe the situation?
Theme: SRS and the work environment (complexity, overload & uncertainty)
12. Have you ever worried about unintentionally causing a security breach in your
work? Can you describe the situation?
67
13. Do you ever feel as though your organization’s information security policy &
procedures are difficult to understand or time-consuming? In what way?
14. Do the information security practices of your organization increase your work-
load? Can you describe how?
15. Do you feel as though there are constant changes in the information security
practices of your organization? What kinds of changes? How do you react to
these changes?
16. How do you/your organization prepare for big information security updates or
policy changes (ie. the GDPR)?
Theme: Preventing and reducing SRS
17. What could make you feel more confident about your information security skills?
18. What would you wish to be changed in the information security policy to make it
easier or more encouraging?
19. How would you like the information security policy and practices to be commu-
nicated to you?
20. How do you feel about information security training? Can you describe what sort
of trainings – if any – your organization organizes? Are these trainings effec-
tive/what would make them better?
